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IS IT WORTH SAVING? THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESPONSIBLE 
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE BEYOND PARK 
 
ELIZABETH LAUTENBACH, J.D. CANDIDATE, 2015 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Health care fraud is a huge money maker for the United States government.  In 2010, the 
government recaptured $4 billion dollars in settlement monies.1  In 2011, the government 
continued the trend and received an increase of about thirty percent more in settlements, 
amassing $6.4 billion dollars from the health care arena alone.2  This current movement shows 
no sign of stopping or slowing down anytime soon.  The government collects these tremendous 
settlement amounts from actors in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry who are 
presently in a state of confusion.  There is a current lack of idea and scope of prosecution, so 
much so that executives do not have a clear understanding of what actions can get them in 
trouble and the enormous criminal and civil penalties that strike both executives and companies 
when they are the center of a prosecution.  The basis for the Food and Drug Administration 
(hereinafter “FDA”) and the Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”) to stand is problematic: 
investigations and prosecution are grounded in two out of date cases and different administrative 
approaches.  
After two significant United States Supreme Court cases and the revival of the use of the 
responsible corporate office doctrine through governmental prosecutions, many within the legal 
                                                                 
1 2011 Year-End Health Care Compliance Update, GIBSON, DUNN, & CRUTCHER LLP (Feb. 6, 2012) 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndHealthCareComplianceUpdate.pdf.  
2 Id. 
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realm are fearful of the use of the doctrine because of the absence of mens rea or knowledge to 
convict.3  Also, many corporate executives fear the punishments that accompany settlements in 
this area including imprisonment and exclusion from any federal healthcare program.4  
Additionally, the DOJ can move forward with prosecution in any case without availing 
themselves of the FDA’s specialized knowledge of investigations and violations.5  For these 
reasons, many industry officers and legal scholars are skeptical of the actual legality of the 
doctrine and advocate for the doctrine to be challenged.6  
Although the responsible corporate officer doctrine7 was borne from good intentions (a 
public welfare statute with strict liability to protect consumers of products the FDA serves), the 
government has misused and will continue to misuse a doctrine that stands on shaky grounds 
unless the courts, government actors, and industry executives can work together to collaborate on 
a solution.  Part II reviews the history of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (hereinafter 
“FD&C Act”) as it relates to the responsible corporate officer doctrine and examines the two 
cases that form the basis of the doctrine: US v. Dotterweich and US v. Park.  Part III introduces 
the government actors and actions that revived the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  Part 
                                                                 
3 Amiad Kushner, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Outside the Public Welfare Context , 93 
N.Y.U. J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 681, 681 (2003).  
4 Abraham Gitterman, Executives Should Think Twice Before Accepting Pleas ‘Relating to Fraud’: The Expansion 
of Exclusion Under the Park Doctrine, 25 No. 6 HTHLAW 1, 2-3 (2013). 
5 Jennifer Bragg, et al., Onus of Responsibility: The Changing Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine , 65 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 525, 534 (2010). 
6 Kushner, supra note 3, at 683.  
7 The term “responsible corporate officer doctrine” is also called the “Park Doctrine” and can be used 
interchangeably. For purposes of this writing, except when citing an official writing, the doctrine will be referred to 
as the “responsible corporate officer doctrine.” 
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IV scrutinizes notable recent settlements identifies the lack of trials in this area.  Part V sets out 
specific recommendations to answer these questions including: (1) judicial review, (2) narrowing 
the doctrine through legislative action, (3) the use of tandem prosecution to include both the 
FDA and DOJ in future prosecutions, and (4) industry action to safeguard corporations from 
possible prosecution.  
 
II. THE PARK PROBLEM 
A. FD&C Act Generally 
In 1938, Congress granted enforcement authority to regulate several product areas 
including food, drugs, cosmetics, and medical devices to the FDA through the FD&C Act.8  The 
FD&C Act prohibits many actions including adulteration and misbranding of a regulated product 
or the introduction of an adulterated or misbranded product into interstate commerce.9 A person 
commits a misdemeanor under the FD&C Act when they “take or cause a prohibited action.”10 
Furthermore, a person who commits the aforementioned violation “with the intent to defraud or 
mislead” or a person who has already been convicted of an FD&C Act violation commits a 
felony.11  The Secretary of the FDA can debar a person convicted of the FD&C Act from 
participation in drug companies12 while the Office of Inspector General (hereinafter “OIG”) can 
                                                                 
8 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006). 
9 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(b). 
10 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2). 
11 Id.   
12 21 U.S.C. § 335(a)(2). 
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exclude a person convicted of the FD&C Act from participation in federal healthcare programs.13 
The FD&C Act is a public welfare statute which imposes strict liability on an act, regardless of 
the actor’s intent knowledge, or personal participation.14 The responsible corporate officer 
doctrine emerged from interpretation of the FD&C Act through the Supreme Court several years 
later. 
B. Responsible Corporate Officer Cases and Comparison/Synthesis  
The Supreme Court faced novel, interpretive questions posed by the two primary cases 
which formed the basis of the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  An individual can be 
personally liable under the FD&C Act if there is proof of inaction when the law demands 
attention or where carelessness is enough to impute guilt.15  If you are a corporate executive 
doing business in an area regulated by the FDA, the Supreme Court through Park and 
Dotterweich imposes an affirmative obligation on the part of those individuals at a corporation 
that have the authority and power to determine whether there was a violation of the FD&C Act to 
make changes, take action, and remedy the situation.16   
i. US v. Dotterweich (1943) 
Joseph Dotterweich served the President and General Manager of the Buffalo Pharmacal 
Company, Inc.17  Buffalo Pharmacal purchased pharmaceutical drugs which they subsequently 
                                                                 
13 See discussion of debarment and exclusion, infra p. 19. 
14 See discussion of the FD&C Act as a public welfare statute, infra pp. 12-13. 
15 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1943). 
16 United States v. Park , 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975). 
17 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. 
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repackaged in a new container and resold to other buyers.18  The government alleged that Buffalo 
Pharmacal and Dotterweich violated the FD&C Act by shipping adulterated or misbranded drug 
in interstate commerce.19  After a trial, both the corporation and Dotterweich were convicted in 
federal court.20 Afterwards, both convictions were reversed on appeal.21   
Upon granting certiorari, the novel question of whether the language of “person” in the 
FD&C Act can convict an individual working on behalf of a corporation faced the Supreme 
Court.22  Writing for the majority,23 Justice Frankfurter answered in the affirmative and reversed 
the finding of the Second Circuit.24  He stated that the FD&C Act is “a now familiar type” of 
statute which “dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct – awareness of 
some wrongdoing.”25  Justice Frankfurter reasoned that the defendant’s rights should be balanced 
against the rights of the public who are defenseless against companies who release an adulterated 
or misbranded product on the market because the FD&C Act is a public health statute.26 The 
Supreme Court articulated the position that a defendant who has a “responsible share in the 
                                                                 
18 Id. 
19 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1938). 
20 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Dotterweich was a close 5-4 decision with a scathing dissent written by Justice Murphy. See discussion of the 
aforementioned dissent, infra pp. 11-12. 
24 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. 
25 Id. at 280-81. 
26 Id. at 278. 
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furtherance of” the transgression which the executive was charged will fail the balancing test and 
should be found guilty at trial.27   
From a policy standpoint, the executive in charge should be accountable for 
transgressions arising from violations occurring during their leadership whether or not they 
personally acted in the violation.  The Supreme Court did not specify a category or set of 
corporate executives who would fit this new standard and left that decision to all involved in the 
trial process, specifically “the good sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and 
the ultimate judgment of juries.”28  
The Dotterweich case gave life to the groundwork of the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine which stands for the principle that a public welfare statute like the federal FD&C Act 
“puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible 
relation to a public danger” for the sake of the public at large.29   In other words, absence of 
knowledge is sufficient for conviction under a public welfare statute.30  They do not have to have 
cooperated, engaged in, or know of the violation to share in a portion of the blame or liability for 
any committed offenses.31   
ii. US v. Park (1975) 
                                                                 
27 Id. at 284.  
28 Id. at 285.  
29  Id. at 281. 
30 Andrew Ellis, “The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: Sharpening a Blunt Health Care Fraud 
Enforcement Tool”, 9 N.Y.U J. L. & BUS., 977, 986 (2013). 
31 Amy Sepinwall, “Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility: In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer 
Liability”, 25 No. 6 COLUM. BUS. L. REV., 371, 378 (2014). 
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The second case that lays the foundation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
came before the Supreme Court in 1975 in US v. Park.32  Similar to Dotterweich, the government 
argued that there were violations pursuant to the FD&C Act at Acme Supermarkets where Park 
served as President.33 However, the breadth of the allegations was much different. While 
Dotterweich did not contaminate the drugs that came into his company’s care, prosecutors 
argued that Park permitted his facilities to become infested with animals and contaminated the 
stored food.34 Additionally, prosecutors alleged that Park knew of the unsanitary conditions in 
his Baltimore warehouses but did not do enough to cure the defects.35  In particular, Park was 
aware of the defects as evidenced by an FDA warning letter as well as two FDA inspections of 
the warehouse in question.36  Instead of personally acting to cure the defects, Park assigned that 
responsibility to the manager of the specific warehouse.37  Park was convicted at trial in the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland38 and that convicted was subsequently 
reversed by the Fourth Circuit in 1973.39  
In 1975, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fourth Circuit primarily with the 
“responsible share” language from Dotterweich.40  Park’s conviction is compelling because the 
                                                                 
32 Park , 421 U.S. at 658. 
33 Id. at 658.  
34 Id. 
35 Id.  
36 Id. at 661-62. 
37 Id. at 658. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
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majority posited that the government does not need to prove that the defendant had any 
knowledge of the underlying offense as long as the person being charged is a corporate executive 
that had the “responsibility and authority” to take action on behalf of the company and “failed to 
do so”.41  After Park, the responsible corporate officer doctrine stands for the principle that an 
executive can be punished if they have the power to stop the offense from happening in the first 
place and they choose not to.42 This principle stems from the corporate executive’s positive duty 
to run a corporation which puts the health and wellness of the public before profit.43  
Additionally, an ensuing conviction of the FD&C Act after any previous conviction of the 
FD&C Act is deemed a felony regardless of the factual circumstances.44  
Further, Justice Burger articulates that an executive can dispute liability by raising an 
impossibility defense. The corporate officer who can show that they were “powerless to prevent 
or correct the violation”45 can mitigate their position.  Does an impossibility defense like the one 
explained in Park change the dynamics in the culpability requirements because it is available?  
Can the responsible corporate officer doctrine rightfully be used as a strict liability standard if 
the executive can raise a defense?  These are questions a corporate executive can raise if one 
chooses to refuse a settlement offer and proceeds to a trial.46  
                                                                 
41 Id. at 673.  
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2). 
45 Id. at 673. 
46 See discussion of settlements , infra pp. 19-30. 
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iii. Synthesis of Similarities and Differences between Dotterweich and 
Park  
FIGURE 1: Dotterweich/Park Analysis 
 
 Individual 
Involved 
FDA 
Regulated 
Product 
FD&C Act 
Violations 
Money Penalties  Knowledge 
Aspects 
US v. 
Dotterweich 
(1943) 
Joseph 
Dotterweich, 
President 
and General 
Manager of 
Buffalo 
Pharmacal 
Company 
Pharmaceutical 
Drugs 
3 
Misdemean-
anor counts 
of shipping 
adulterated 
and 
misbranded 
drugs into 
interstate 
commerce 
N/A Conviction 
under the 
FD&C 
Act 
No 
Knowledge 
US v. Park 
(1975) 
John Park, 
President 
and CEO of 
Acme 
Supermarket 
Food 5 
Misdemean-
anor counts 
of causing 
adulteration 
of food  
N/A Conviction 
under the 
FD&C 
Act 
Knowledge: 
repeated 
warning 
letters, a 
failed FDA 
inspection 
 
There are two distinct similarities between the two aforementioned cases. The first 
similarity is their position. Dotterweich and Park were both presidents of their respective 
companies.  While neither case sets out a list of specific persons who hold specific positions 
within a company that will be subject to prosecution through a FD&C Act investigation, these 
Supreme Court cases makes it certain that the executive at the top will be ultimately responsible 
for any violations during their watch whether they are involved in the violations in question or 
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not. The second similarity between Dotterweich and Park is that both the companies and the 
presidents were prosecuted under the FD&C Act. The FD&C Act is a public welfare statute that 
enjoys the benefits of strict liability.47 
There is one substantial difference between the Dotterweich and Park cases. While the 
Dotterweich case does not go into many specifics in regards to its facts, it is clear that 
Dotterweich did not know the actions of what happened to the drugs that were the center of this 
violation.  In fact, the dissent points out that the government did not introduce proof that 
Dotterweich had any involvement or participation in the violation.48  30 years later in Park, a 
much different scenario was presented. Over the course of three years, Park received several 
warning letters and a failed inspection notice from the FDA concerning contamination of a 
specific food storage warehouse.49  Armed with this knowledge, it was easy for Park to rectify 
the problem because he was aware of the conduct.50  However, Park did not do enough within 
his power to remedy the problem.51 Instead, Park was flippant when tasked to make changes that 
could improve the safety of those that consume his products. 52 Therefore, Park can be 
distinguished from Dotterweich because Park is less problematic from a mens rea standpoint. 
Park knew of the offenses and did not stop them; he only delegated the responsibility to others.  
C. Implications/Departure from Criminal Law Concepts  
                                                                 
47 See discussion of criminal law tenets, infra pp. 10-13. 
48 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286. 
49 Park , 421 U.S. at 658.  
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. 
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i. Mens Rea Culpability Requirement 
In criminal cases, an accused must have acted with the requisite mens rea to be convicted 
of the alleged crime.53  The responsible corporate officer doctrine expanded the range of liability 
because the government does not need to prove knowledge or intent of the crime for executives 
to be culpable of FD&C Act violations as well as responsible corporate officer doctrine 
violations.54  Under the tents of criminal law, a defendant’s conduct must rise to the level of 
intent of mens rea in order to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause.55  Since 
corporate officers without knowledge of the violation can and are found criminally accountable 
due solely to their position of authority within the corporation, transgression pursued under the 
responsible corporate office doctrine do not meet the culpability specifications the Supreme 
Court articulated in Gypsum.  Accordingly, those that were not engaged in the crime are charged 
and suffer severe consequences, extending the scope of liability past what criminal law tenets 
intended.56   
These specific concerns of the responsible corporate officer doctrine travel back to 1943 
when the dissent in Dotterweich took issue with the lack of evidence of knowledge or 
participation in the federal FD&C Act violation of Mr. Dotterweich’s conviction.57  The dissent 
objects to the majority action of inserting an individual theory of liability into a statute that was 
                                                                 
53 Ariel Glasner, Are Misdemeanor Prosecutions Under the Park Doctrine an Effective Mechanism for Deterring 
Violations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act? FDLI POLICY FORUM, 1, 3 (2011). 
54 Id. 
55 United States v. United States Gypsum Co ., 438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978).  
56 Sepinwall, supra note 31, at 379. 
57 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 286.  
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not included in the final legislation.58  The dissent also takes offense to the extent of the scope 
that this ruling would have moving forward.59  For example, Justice Murphy stated that a person 
should not be found guilty of a crime without an “evil intention or consciousness of wrongdoing” 
and public policy reasons should not run around basic tenets of criminal law.60  A court today 
could take this reasoning and use it to limit the responsible corporate officer doctrine for future 
investigations and prosecutions. 
ii. Strict Liability  
Additionally, the Supreme Court could limit the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
because strict liability under public welfare offenses is not applicable today.  The theory of strict 
liability derives from the notion that it is the job of the executive to make sure their products are 
safe for the public when corporations are making a substantial amount of money from the 
products.61  The majority in Dotterweich posited that public welfare statutes like the FD&C Act 
“dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct – awareness of some 
wrongdoing…”62  The Supreme Court has upheld public welfare offenses in a narrow set of 
cases where penalties are “relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an 
offender’s reputation.”63  Nevertheless, using the public welfare offenses doctrine to offenses 
                                                                 
58 Id. at 290. 
59 Id. at 286. 
60 Id. 
61 See Id. at 282-83 (“If the 1938 Act were construed as it was below, the penalties of the law could be imposed only 
in the rare case where the corporation is merely an individual's alter ego. Corporations carrying on an illicit trade 
would be subject only to…a ‘license fee’ for the conduct of an illegitimate business.”). 
62 Id. at 281.  
63 Morisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
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under the responsible corporate officer doctrine today is short-sighted because it frustrates the 
criminal law tenets of knowledge and participation in the underlying offense.64 Additionally, 
prosecutors are able to wield this power over defendants which could be a reason for the large 
number of settlements in the pharmaceutical and medical device area.  
Responsible corporate officer doctrine convictions do not fall within the category of 
“relatively small” or “does no grave damage to an offender’s reputation.”65  Not only do these 
convictions fall outside those categories, they are far from it.66 Commentators have questioned 
whether it is appropriate to continue prosecution under the responsible corporate office doctrine 
when the public welfare offense exception does not squarely fit and this doctrine could violate 
due process rights.67  By prosecuting solely because of position within an organization and not 
prosecuting the ones who committed the violations, the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
establishes a new set of individuals that can be implicated68 and is in contrast to corporate law 
principles where personally acting in the underlying offense is necessary for individual 
liability.69 
 
III. THE ROLE OF THE FDA/CONSEQUENCES FOR PROSECUTION 
                                                                 
64 Kushner, supra note 3, at 682-83. 
65 Glasner, supra note 53. 
66 Id.  
67 Bragg, et al., supra note 5, at 525. 
68 Ellis, supra note 30, at 981. 
69 Kushner, supra note 3, at 684-85. 
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Penalties for violations of various aspects of the FD&C Act had previously been applied 
to individuals solely because of their corporate positions through the responsible corporate 
officer doctrine.  The responsible corporate officer doctrine, after its creation, fell into disfavor 
when the FDA did not want to take an active role in investigating what would be cases classified 
as misdemeanors.70  The responsible corporate officer doctrine, through the FD&C Act imposes 
an affirmative obligation to determine whether there were violations of law happening within the 
organization, take action, and remedy the situation.71  
A. From Bridging the Gap to Grassley 
Reliance and prosecutions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine waned when 
the doctrine fell into disfavor after 1960s-early 1970’s and was not used in the health 
care/pharmaceutical and medical device realm.72  Because of this lack of development, industry 
executives were not worried about being the center of a prosecution. In 2010, the Government 
Accountability Office, through Senator Charles E. Grassley the ranking member of the United 
States Senate’s Committee on Finance, began to criticize the FDA for not taking a more active 
role in criminal prosecutions of those who commit violations under the FDA’s watch when it is 
the responsibility of the FDA to regulate prescription and over-the-counter drugs.73 They also 
highlighted the growing sentiment that government agencies should being to act more 
                                                                 
70 Gitterman, supra note 4, at 4. 
71 Park , 421 U.S. at 673-74. 
72 Ellis, supra note 30, at 989.  
73 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-10-221, Food and Drug Administration: Improved Monitoring and 
Development of Performance Measures Needed to Strengthen Oversight of Criminal and Misconduct Investigations 
10, at 1 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10221.pdf. 
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aggressively with an increase in investigations.74  Particularly, the GAO suggested that the 
Office of Criminal Investigations (hereinafter “OCI”) play a more critical role in investigations.75  
However, despite these sentiments, nowhere in the report did the GAO instruct the FDA to 
revive such a powerful tool as the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  
B. Tide Turns: Commissioner Hamburg’s Signal to Industry 
In response to Senator Grassley and the Committee of Finance’s sentiment, Margaret 
Hamburg, the Commissioner of the FDA, recommended an increase of misdemeanor 
prosecutions to hold corporate executives responsible for violations made on their watch.76  The 
change in FDA stance was attributed to the perceived lack of investigation by the FDA in regards 
to FD&C Act violations.77  FDA Commissioner Hamburg’s description of the increase of 
misdemeanor prosecution under the doctrine as a “valuable enforcement tool”78 was a telling 
indication to all in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry that the FDA planned to 
resurrect a doctrine that had not been in use for decades to prosecute companies and those 
responsible for FD&C Act infractions in addition to including a whole new set of potential 
defendants.79   
                                                                 
74 Id. at 2. 
75 Glasner, supra note 53, at 2.  
76 Letter from Margaret Hamburg, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., to Sen. Charles Grassley, at 2 (Mar. 4, 2010) 
available at http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-report-on-
Oci.pdf.  
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Glasner, supra note 53, at 3-4. 
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To that end, the FDA released FDA “Manual 6-5-3: Recommending Park Doctrine” 
which listed nonbinding criteria that the FDA will use to recommend criminal prosecutions 
against a corporate officer in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry to be considered in 
addition to the Supreme Court’s findings in Park and Dotterweich.80  These criteria include:  
 
(1) Whether the violation involves actual or potential harm to the 
public; 
(2) Whether the violation is obvious; 
(3) Whether the violation reflects a pattern of illegal behavior 
and/or failure to heed prior warnings; 
(4) Whether the violation is widespread; 
(5) Whether the violation is serious; 
(6) The quality of the legal and factual support for the proposed 
prosecution; and 
(7) Whether the proposed prosecution is a prudent use of agency 
resources.81 
 
The responsible corporate officer doctrine provides that an executive can be held liable 
for a first time misdemeanor, and a felony violation for any additional conviction, under the 
federal FD&C Act without proof that the corporate official acted with intent or even 
negligence.82 Additionally, the corporate official did not have to have any actual knowledge of, 
or participation in, the specific offense.83  Knowledge of and actual participation in the violation 
                                                                 
80 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL § 6-5-3 – 2011, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 6-
5-3, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM074317.pdf (last 
updated Sept. 16, 2011) [hereinafter REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL]. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
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are not a prerequisite to a misdemeanor prosecution but are factors that may be relevant when 
deciding whether to recommend charging a misdemeanor violation.84  Moreover, responsibility 
and control are central to the analysis of whether to bring a prosecution against an executive.  
The troubling aspect of this Manual is just that: it is a non-binding guidance document 
and not meant to hold more weight than the DOJ’s authority to prosecute.85  The ultimate 
decision to prosecute lies with the DOJ regardless of whether the evidence in a particular case 
satisfies the aforementioned criteria.86   
C. Relationship between FDA/DOJ/OIG  
There are multiple arms of the government that theoretically should play a role in 
investigations and prosecutions under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  The Office of 
Criminal Investigations (hereinafter “OCI” is the FDA’s investigatory arm.87  All referrals for 
potential criminal prosecution under the FD&C Act must first travel through the OCI.88  
However, the matter is not closed if the OCI decides against moving forward with potential 
prosecution.89  
                                                                 
84 Id. 
85 Anne Walsh, FDA Finally Releases “Non-binding” Park Doctrine Criteria, FDA LAW BLOG (Feb. 6, 2011) 
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/02/fda-finally-releases-non-binding-park-doctrine-
criteria.html. 
86 Id. “The absence of some factors does not mean that a referral is inappropriate where other factors are evident.”  
87 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION: INSPECTIONS, COMPLIANCE, ENFORCEMENT, AND CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/criminalInvestigations/default.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2014). 
88 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-1, 6-5-2.  
89 Id. at §§ 6-5-1. 
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There is an additional concern over prosecutions made by the DOJ under the responsible 
corporate officer doctrine that the FDA does not participate in.  The False Claims Act allows 
private citizens to file suit on behalf of the government in exchange for a percentage of the 
monetary award.90 A suit filed by an individual on behalf of the government is known as a qui 
tam action, and the private citizen who files the suit is called a relator.91  The DOJ can intervene 
and proceed in the action already begun by attorneys outside of the government without any 
specialized knowledge by FDA experts.92   
These governmental bodies use many penalties to punish those are convicted of a 
violation of the FD&C Act and deter those who are tempted to commit a violation of the FD&C 
Act. To further prevent corporate officers from committing a crime which would then violate the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine, the government is using their power to block officers and 
corporations from doing business in the area of federal health care programs.  The FDA has the 
power to debar93 and the OIG has the ability to exclude 94both individuals and corporations after 
they are convicted under the responsible corporate officer doctrine through a violation of a 
statute like the FD&C Act.  For individuals, there is a presumption to exclude unless there are 
“significant factors [that] weigh against exclusion”95.  To this end, the OIG utilizes both 
                                                                 
90 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2014). 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 21 U.S.C. § 306; 21 U.S.C. § 335(a). 
94 21 U.S.C. § 335(a). 
95 Office of Inspector Gen., GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTING PERMISSIVE EXCLUSION AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 
1128(B)(15) OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT (Oct. 20, 2010), available at 
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/exclusions/files/permissive_ excl_under_1128b15_10192010.pdf.  
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mandatory and permissible exclusions which are codified in the “Exclusion of certain individuals 
and entities from participation in Medicare and State health care programs” statute.96 The 
mandatory and permissive exclusions are codified.97 
Corporations who are reimbursed from federal health care programs these penalties 
seriously because the OIG can block payment to any enterprise that is excluded or employs or 
contracts with excluded individuals.98  This is effectively a death sentence; no company or 
corporate executive can continue to do business in the pharmaceutical and medical device realm 
if they cannot sell prescription drugs within the government funded health care program realm.99  
Even if the corporate executive would like to try to get back within the industry while excluded, 
every company checks the FDA debarment list and OIG exclusion list before hiring. 
 
IV. SETTLEMENTS 
The pharmaceutical and medical device industry are not willing go to trial under a 
responsible corporate officer doctrine, evidenced by settling all prosecutions.  They are scared of 
the potentially high penalties faced with a guilty verdict after a long trial and uncertainty of what 
could happen to both the corporation in question’s future and the executives themselves.  
Additionally, the fact that there have been no significant trials in this area is troubling because 
                                                                 
96 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2010).  
97 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1)-(4) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1)-(16) (2010). 
98 Ellis, supra note 30, at 979.  
99 Id. at 994.  
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the industry cannot look to the judiciary for guidance except for two dated cases and no trial 
level case since the adoption of FDA Manual 6-5-3.   
There are many questions can be raised: Would the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
and how the government is prosecuting under it hold up in court today?  What criteria of FDA 
Manual 6-5-3 were at issue in each settlement? Were any criteria actually used by the FDA or 
the DOJ? What was the FDA’s role in each settlement? There have been several prominent 
settlements under the responsible corporate officer doctrine in the pharmaceutical and medical 
device area and each one contributes to the discussion of where governmental agencies will be 
focusing in their investigations and prosecution in this area moving forward.  
 
A. Perdue Frederick 
In 2007, the government brought an action against The Perdue Frederick Pharmaceutical 
Company and the chief executive officer, general counsel, and chief medical officer individually 
for criminal and civil violations of off-label promotion under the FD&C Act.100  Specifically, the 
government alleged that they stated misinformation in regards to safety profile of the drug 
OxyContin.101  Rather than risk high punishments at trial, Perdue Frederick pleaded guilty to 
felony misbranding charges for “failure to prevent Purdue’s fraudulent marketing of OxyContin” 
and paid a fine of $600 million to settle.102  Additionally, three executives of Purdue who were in 
charge at the time of the violations pleaded guilty to misdemeanor misbranding, the OIG 
                                                                 
100 Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813, 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
101 Id. at 816.  
102 United States v. Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d 569, 569 (W.D. Va. 2007). 
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excluded the executives from working for any corporation receiving federal funds, and they 
agreed to enter into a five year corporate integrity agreement.103  
In 2009, the debarred executives sued the OIG and Health and Human Services (HHS) 
arguing that the government cannot exclude/debar someone by virtue of a violation based on the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine because of the lack of evidence and proof of personal 
wrongdoing.104  As an alternative argument, the executives contended that the exclusion period 
of twenty years was inappropriate when the length of exclusion authorized by statute is 
considered which was “3 years, unless the Secretary determines in accordance with published 
regulations that…a longer period is appropriate because of aggravating circumstances.”105  In 
2010, the district court upheld the exclusion since the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
applies and they were properly excluded by the OIG stating that “section 1320a–7(b)(1) appears 
to permit the exclusion of anyone convicted of an offense ‘having a connection with or reference 
to’ fraud or financial misconduct in the delivery of a health care item or service.”106 
In 2012, the appellate court reversed and remanded the district court’s decision of the 
length of exclusion.107  While the conviction for misdemeanor misbranding and the exclusion 
decision by the OIG were sustained because the convictions were “factually related to fraud”, the 
length of exclusion was technically authorized by statute and the court ordered HHS to provide 
                                                                 
103 Friedman, 686 F.3d at 816.  
104 Id. at 817.  
105 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1) and (3) was used by the OIG since this was a permissive exclusion.  
106 Friedman v. Sebelius, 755 F.Supp.2d 98, 107–08 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384, (1992)). 
107 Friedman v. Sebelius, 686 F.3d 813 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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justification that the facts of the case and the involvement of these specific individuals justified 
that type of disbarment.108  In fact, an explanation for the length of exclusion and reconciliation 
with prior exclusion decisions was not given by the Secretary.109  The OIG had not come close to 
giving an exclusion period of this length before; the previous longest exclusion period had been 
lower than ten years for a misdemeanor conviction.110  
However, the Friedman Court endorsed the district court’s reading of the responsible 
corporate officer doctrine by ruling that the corporate executives had the “power and authority” 
to prevent the fraudulent marketing but failed to so do which justifies debarment from the federal 
healthcare system whether or not person had personal knowledge on which the charges were 
levied.111 This finding was a resounding affirmation of the responsible corporate officer doctrine 
in this context and the first time a Court of Appeals agreed.112  
While the underlying facts seem at first glance more analogous to the Park situation, the 
underlying facts are more analogous to the Dotterweich case.  Like in Park, the company 
committed acts that are dangerous to the public at large for several years and had ample means to 
correct.  Instead of correcting those misdeeds, Purdue Frederick continued those misdeeds.  
However, knowledge of the three executives was not found due to that fact was stipulated to in 
the settlement.113 The DOJ did not have a warning letter or failed inspection to bolster their 
                                                                 
108 Id. at 828.  
109 Id. at 825.  
110 Id. at 828.  
111 Id. at 817.  
112 Ellis, supra note 30, at 1013.  
113 Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
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argument like in the Park situation. In reference to the FDA Manual, it is clear that at least a 
majority of the Manual’s criteria are satisfied with this situation: purposefully misbranding a 
drug with a severe risk of addiction and abuse caused very serious114 harm to the public115 and 
the training programs that educated sales representatives to employ these marketing techniques 
were obvious, 116 widespread, 117 and a pattern of illegal behavior. 118 119 
B. Synthes  
In 2009, the government prosecuted Synthes executives outside of the commercial 
management chain.120  The government alleged violations of the FD&C Act when Synthes 
performed clinical trials of a bone filler medical device manufactured by its subsidiary Norian 
without FDA approval.121  Both Synthes and Norian pleaded guilty to shipping adulterated and 
misbranded medical devices in interstate commerce resulting in just over $23 million in criminal 
and civil penalties while Synthes executives (the President of Synthes North America, President 
of Synthes Spine Division, Vice President of Operations, and Director of Regulatory and Clinical 
Affairs)122 pleaded guilty to misdemeanor misbranding under the responsible corporate officer 
                                                                 
114 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-3(5). 
115 Id. at §§ 6-5-3(1). 
116 Id. at §§ 6-5-3(2). 
117 Id. at §§ 6-5-3(4). 
118 Id. at §§ 6-5-3(3). 
119 Purdue Frederick Co., 495 F. Supp. 2d at 571. 
120 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, International Medical Device Maker Agrees to Plead Guilty in 
Connection with Shipments of Adulterated and Misbranded Bone Cement Products , (October 4, 2010), 
http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm228273.htm. 
121 Id.  
122 United States v. Huggins, No. 09-403-3, 201 WL 6180623, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2011). 
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doctrine and sentenced to imprisonment of five to nine months.123  In addition to imprisonment 
and monetary penalties, Norian faced exclusion by the OIG.  
The Synthes case is important because the facts are a departure from the traditional 
responsible corporate officer doctrine prosecutions.  Not only did the executives know of the 
underlying offenses, but they actively engaged to conceal relevant information and made false 
statements to the FDA.124  That information led to a meaningful amount of jail time for Synthes 
executives who had agreed to a FD&C Act misdemeanor conviction, the first time that has 
happened within the pharmaceutical and medical device industry due to the “unprecedented 
nature” of the Synthes executives’ actions.125  
The Synthes facts are in no way analogous to the Dotterweich case and would be closer 
to the Park case.  The executives had knowledge of the misdeeds from internal emails regarding 
off-label use of the medical device not approved of by the FDA which led to patient injuries.126  
In addition, these same executives created and ran unauthorized clinical trials against FDA 
policy.127  However, imprisonment for a misdemeanor a troubling aspect of this case is 
imprisonment for a misdemeanor violation under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. The 
sentencing judge posited that this case could be distinguished from Park.  Specifically, it was 
noted that “[t]his case does not involve standard Park-doctrine behavior, in which an unaware 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
123 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, supra note 116. 
124 Id. 
125 Huggins, 2011 WL 6180623, at *2. 
126 Id. at 3.  
127 Id. at 5. 
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corporate official is held strictly liable for the conduct of his subordinates.”128  This point raises 
serious questions concerning the appropriateness of accepting a misdemeanor strict liability  
responsible corporate officer doctrine plea deal due to the facts that penalties such as 
imprisonment does an immense amount of damage to an executive’s reputation and millions of 
dollars in fines are no longer relatively small.129  
C. KV Pharmaceuticals  
In 2011, the Chief Executive Officer of KV Pharmaceuticals, Marc S. Hermelin, was 
charged with misbranding drugs under the FD&C Act.130  Over a two year period, Hermelin 
ordered manufacturing increases of a range of generic drugs made in house.131 Under Hermelin’s 
leadership, the company did not take care in producing a quality product.132 Specifically, the 
management received both internal reports of irregularly shaped and oversized prescription drugs 
through manufacturing controls and safety assessments as well as external reports from 
customers who were given the product.133   
As part of accepting the settlement, Hermelin stated that the labeling on KV 
Pharmaceuticals’ products were “false and misleading” because the specification of “uniform 
                                                                 
128 Id. at 13. 
129 See discussion of strict liability statute, supra pp. 12-13. 
130 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 2011 Marc S. Hermelin, Former CEO of KV Pharmaceutical, Pleads 
Guilty to Misbranding Drugs and Agrees to Pay United States $1.9 Million as Fines and Forfeiture , (March 10, 
2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm246881.htm. 
131 Id.  
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
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strength” on the labels was incorrect due to the irregularities of their products.134   Since the 
products in question were shipped from St. Louis and discovered in California, the prescription 
drugs crossed state lines where KV Pharmaceuticals introduced the drugs into interstate 
commerce135.  Hermlich was sentenced to a month of prison and penalties including a million 
dollar fine, $900,000 in forfeiture fees136, and exclusion from participation in federal healthcare 
programs by the HHS OIG for 20 years.137   
Both KV and Hermelin’s actions satisfy many of the criteria in FDA Manual 6-5-3. The 
pharmaceutical drug violations were obvious,138 serious,139 and had the potential for harm to the 
public.140  Be that as it may, like the executives in Synthes, Hermelin’s punishment after a 
settlement for a strict liability crime is much larger than the punishments anticipated by the 
majority in Dotterweich. 
D. Forest Laboratories 
Forest Laboratories pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor misbranding charge for marketing 
an antidepressant drug before FDA approval and in spite of FDA warning letters. 141 The 
corporation paid monetary penalties and forfeited assets totaling hundreds of millions of 
                                                                 
134 Former Drug Company Executive Pleads Guilty in Oversized Drug Tablets Case , U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
(March 10, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-drug-company-executive-pleads-guilty-oversized-drug-
tablets-case.  
135 Id. 
136 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, supra note 131. 
137 Glasner, supra note 53, at 3.  
138 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-3. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Glasner, supra note 53, at 3.  
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dollars.142  The OIG decided to pursue exclusion for the chairman of Forest Laboratories, 
Howard Solomon.143  However, this situation was unique because Solomon was never convicted 
in his individual capacity in the Forest Laboratories settlement, marking this as the first time the 
OIG was seeking to exclude a corporate executive solely due to their position within a company 
that accepted a settlement offer.144  While the OIG eventually decided against exclusion in light 
of evidence submitted on behalf of Solomon, the Forest Laboratories matter is troubling because 
the OIG sought to exclude Solomon with no criminal charges linking Solomon individually to 
the underlying offense.145  
E. Synthesis of Settlements/Conclusion  
FIGURE 2: Synthesis of Settlements 
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142 U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Forest Pharmaceuticals To Pay $164 Million For Criminal Violations, 
(March 2, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm245543.htm.  
143 Michael E. Clark, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine A Re-Emergent Threat to General Counsel and 
Corporate Officers, 14 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 5, 8 (2012).   
144 Id.  
145 Id. 
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These settlements serve as an example of a current trend that should concern those who 
may be at the center of a future prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine. 
Governmental arms are overreaching and misusing the responsible corporate officer doctrine in 
two ways. First, penalties for strict liability public welfare offenses were not intended to result in 
the penalties ordered by courts today (Purdue Frederick and Synthes). Additionally, they are 
punishing those who have not been convicted on an individual basis (Forest Laboratories). A 
conviction should be the basis on which the government penalizes a corporate wrongdoer, and 
the penalties should be appropriate with the spirit of the statute.   
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V. DEVELOPMENT/RECOMMENDATIONS 
It is increasingly becoming difficult for companies to determine and difficulty in what 
kind of certainty and provisions to tell clients in the industry facing an investigation or 
prosecution under the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  Observers are doubtful of the 
legality of the responsible corporate officer doctrine for the reasons set forth above and would 
support a challenge.146  From a policy perspective, if the uncertainty of punishments given in the 
past as well as uncertainty over where settlement punishments are going in the future deters even 
one skilled, quality candidate that could make a difference in the company they choose to serve 
for the patients they choose to serve from taking a corporate executive job because of the 
aforementioned uncertainty, the cost of uncertainty may be too high.147  The glowing 
endorsement given by Commissioner Hamburg suggests that the FDA will not stop using such a 
powerful tool and corporate executives need to pay close attention to any moves the FDA would 
make in this area.148   
The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is warranted to keep corporate executives in 
check. Any deterrent factor the doctrine has is a positive for the industry and society.149  
However, one commented posited that the government should prosecute executives independent 
of participation in the underlying offense.150  Additionally, she offered the view that executives 
                                                                 
146 Glasner, supra note 53, at 3.  
147 Id. at 6-7. 
148 REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL §§ 6-5-3. 
149 Sepinwall, supra note 31, at 376.  
150 Id. at 378. 
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should be punished solely on the grounds of their position.151  This approach seems too harsh and 
for the reasons set forth, should not be the effect of this doctrine.  
 
A. Ability of judicial review? 
The responsible corporate officer doctrine was borne from Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation.152  Nonetheless, safeguards that were placed in effect by the Supreme Court are 
not being used by the FDA and DOJ. For example, Justice Burger in Park suggested that 
recommending the class of executives responsible in a certain situation should be dependent on 
evidence produced to the jury in a trial.153  Justice Burger’s sentiment is not being followed 
today because there has not been one violation of the FD&C Act in the pharmaceutical and 
medical device industry has gone to trial after FDA Commissioner Hamburg revived the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine.  Since there is a disparity between the uncertain utilization 
of the doctrine by the FDA and the DOJ, is there a way for the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine to be revised from the high court? 
This remedy is not likely to occur right away.  Although the Supreme Court can take this 
issue with the right case, there are several reasons why this recommendation may not be 
immediately possible. First, executives must be willing to risk steep penalties both professionally 
(debarment or exclusion) and/or personally (imprisonment). Additionally, the corporation must 
be willing to roll the dice and risk large fines and/or the ability to continue doing business in the 
                                                                 
151 Id. at 380. 
152 See discussion of case law, supra pp. 4-10. 
153 Park , 421 U.S. at 669.  
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government funded pharmaceutical and medical device realm. While the ability of judicial 
review is possible, it is not probable in the near future. 
 
B. Narrowing the Doctrine through the legislature? 
Government agencies are looking to utilize the responsible corporate officer doctrine as a 
basis for criminal prosecutions. At the very least, the FDA should revise their manual to make a 
more stream-lined approach to investigating and recommending prosecution to the DOJ.  The 
most egregious FD&C Act violations are the ones where the corporate officer responsible for the 
company has knowledge of the underlying offenses but fails to take action to remedy the 
situation.154  These circumstances fit squarely within the spirit of past Supreme Court decisions 
(Park and Dotterweich) together with the criteria of FDA Manual 6-5-3; therefore, these 
situations do not raise serious concerns of prosecution of FD&C Act violations under the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine.  
However, there are questions of whether these prosecutions have a deterrent factor for 
those executives who have no knowledge of the underlying offense because that seems 
counterintuitive: an executive cannot be deterred from committing an offense if they do not 
know of an offense being committed. If the FDA revised their manual to recommend prosecution 
against those who received warning letters and failed to take corrective action, more within the 
government who act in this area as well as corporate executives would have a better idea of what 
kinds of acts can fall within the responsible corporate officer doctrine.  
                                                                 
154 Glasner, supra note 53, at 5.  
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C. Tandem Prosecution 
The specific concern lies with the fact that when a qui tam155 action in this area proceeds 
without the help or specialized knowledge of FDA experts, it circumvents the intended use of the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine by the Supreme Court.156 As such, there should be judicial 
concern if the FDA is not involved. If the FDA recommends that an investigation should 
conclude should the DOJ not pursue prosecution?  The possibility of a collaborative agreement 
between the FDA and DOJ would likely alleviate these concerns. If a collaborative agreement is 
possible, the DOJ can still use their power of choosing which qui tam cases to intervene in and 
prosecute with the FDA’s specialized knowledge. If a collaborative agreement is not possible, a 
recommendation for the DOJ to enact guidelines similar to FDA Manual 6-5-3 would be a step in 
the right direction.157 
 
D. Industry Action to Safeguard Itself from Possible Prosecution  
The responsible corporate officer doctrine, through Park and Dotterweich, was conceived 
before companies throughout the industry constructed their own complex compliance programs. 
However, starting and maintaining a comprehensive compliance programs may be the only 
realistic real-time option executives in this area have because relying on the Supreme Court to 
decide could take ten to fifteen years if at all.  This estimate is premised on the realization that a 
                                                                 
155 See discussion of the FDA’s relationship with the DOJ in reference to qui tam actions, supra p. 18. 
156 U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 73, at 8.  
157 The concerns of FDA Manual 6-5-3, discussed supra, would carry over to any guidelines the DOJ enacts.  
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corporation may not turn down a settlement offer because of the severe penalties one would face 
if they proceed to trial and assumption that the Supreme Court or a Court of Appeals may not 
grant certiorari to hear the case. Additionally, executives should not rely on the Legislature or 
pass new laws or amend existing laws to make this doctrine more clear (although submitting a 
citizen’s petition could be faster if executives ask the government to work with industry 
professionals).   
Industry should be aware of FDA or DOJ triggers that can alert an executive that an FDA 
investigation or a DOJ prosecution is near.  It is uncertain whether the FDA Manual 6-5-3 
criteria are used to determine which investigations to refer to the DOJ or whether the DOJ takes 
the criteria into account when determining which cases to prosecute and/or settle.  All specific 
FDA feedback on any potential violations through a warning letter or a failed inspection should 
be reviewed with extreme caution.  Industry officers would do well to work with the FDA at this 
stage to prevent a prosecution recommendation to the DOJ. Additionally, industry executives 
should monitor all available corporate integrity agreements to see where the DOJ has paid 
particular attention to within other companies. 
Since the responsible corporate officer doctrine was formed from public policy aspects of 
ensuring the safety of the public at large as well as the efficacy of the federal health care 
programs, industry should take an introspective look at their companies and their corporate 
officers to determine specific offices or departments that lack oversight.  
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While the responsible corporate office doctrine goes further than it should in regards to 
the principle tenets of criminal law, the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is a necessary 
tool for the government to punish wrongdoers and deter others who are tempted to commit the 
same illegal conduct.  The policy reasons of keeping corporate officers in check to ensure the 
safety the public at large is extremely important.  However, those facing prosecution under the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine cannot fully contemplate punishments under the doctrine 
due to the misuse of the doctrine by government agencies that rely on dated cases that stand on 
shaky constitutional grounds.  With that in mind, I propose that the question of whether the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine should be abolished is misplaced and instead invite the 
question of what can be done to retool what could be a useful device for all to comply with laws 
and requirements within managerial ranks of a pharmaceutical or medical device corporation.  
 
